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AWS cdk: Editorial rewrite of CDK security guide wording and formatting

Service: cdk · 2026-10-31 · Documentation low

File: cdk/v2/guide/security.md

Summary

Reworded the shared responsibility and security boundary sections, renamed headings ('Run CDK code in a trusted execution environment', 'Deploy to a trusted environment'), and reformatted the list of access scenarios CDK cannot guard against into bullet points. No new security guidance or technical content was added.

Security assessment

The diff only rephrases existing security guidance and reformats it into bullets; it introduces no new security feature, fix, or vulnerability reference, so it is a low-severity editorial change.

Evidence

+### Run CDK code in a trusted execution environment

Diff

diff --git a/cdk/v2/guide/security.md b/cdk/v2/guide/security.md
index 6d29139..ffd8eec 100644
--- a//cdk/v2/guide/security.md
+++ b//cdk/v2/guide/security.md
@@ -21 +21 @@ Cloud security at Amazon Web Services (AWS) is the highest priority. As an AWS c
-The AWS CDK follows the [shared responsibility model](https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/shared-responsibility-model/) through the specific Amazon Web Services (AWS) services it supports. For AWS service security information, see the [AWS service security documentation page](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/security/?id=docs_gateway#aws-security) and [AWS services that are in scope of AWS compliance efforts by compliance program](https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/services-in-scope/).
+The AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) follows the [shared responsibility model](https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/shared-responsibility-model/) through the specific Amazon Web Services (AWS) services it supports. For AWS service security information, see the [AWS service security documentation page](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/security/?id=docs_gateway#aws-security) and [AWS services that are in scope of AWS compliance efforts by compliance program](https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/services-in-scope/).
@@ -29 +29 @@ Given a program written in a general purpose programming language that describes
-_(AWS' responsibility)_ Constructs in the AWS Construct Library are designed to generate infrastructure that does not allow data disclosure, data manipulation, elevation of privilege or other tampering by external parties (that is, unauthenticated identities or identities from different AWS Accounts; unless explicitly configured otherwise, which is in line with the [shared responsibility model](https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/shared-responsibility-model/)).
+_(AWS' responsibility)_ Constructs in the AWS Construct Library are designed to generate infrastructure that does not allow data disclosure, data manipulation, elevation of privilege or other tampering by external parties (meaning unauthenticated identities or identities from different AWS Accounts; unless explicitly configured otherwise, which is in line with the [shared responsibility model](https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/shared-responsibility-model/)).
@@ -33 +33 @@ Any violation of this expectation can be reported [through the company-wide vuln
-### Execution (synthesis) in a trusted environment
+### Run CDK code in a trusted execution environment
@@ -41 +41 @@ Similarly, you should not deploy cloud assemblies from sources that you do not t
-### Deployment to a trusted environment
+### Deploy to a trusted environment
@@ -43 +43 @@ Similarly, you should not deploy cloud assemblies from sources that you do not t
-_(Your responsibility)_ CDK treats the [AWS Account as the security boundary](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/accounts/latest/reference/accounts-welcome.html), as is consistent with the [AWS well-architected framework](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/wellarchitected/latest/security-pillar/aws-account-management-and-separation.html). Not all synthesized infrastructure can be guaranteed to be secure against actors with permissions in the same Account. Some unintentional access scenarios that CDK cannot guard against include, but are not limited to: CDK may create [AWS Lambda-based CloudFormation Custom Resources](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSCloudFormation/latest/UserGuide/template-custom-resources.html) to perform certain actions at deployment time, any identity with `lambda:InvokeFunction` permissions will be able to trigger such a Function and effectively assume the Function’s Execution Role permissions; CloudFormation Stack deployments are able to replace resource policies on resources "owned" by another Stack; AWS StepFunctions-backed Custom Resources hold a signed S3 URL secret in their State Machine State that is readable by anyone with `stepfunctions:DescribeExecution` permissions.
+_(Your responsibility)_ CDK treats the AWS [Account as the security boundary](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/accounts/latest/reference/accounts-welcome.html). This is consistent with the AWS [Well-Architected Framework](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/wellarchitected/latest/security-pillar/aws-account-management-and-separation.html). CDK cannot guarantee that all synthesized infrastructure is secure against actors with permissions in the same Account. Some examples of scenarios that CDK cannot guard against include, but are not limited to, the following:
@@ -45 +45,10 @@ _(Your responsibility)_ CDK treats the [AWS Account as the security boundary](ht
-You should not use CDK in an environment where untrusted identities may perform AWS CloudFormation deployments, or where untrusted identities have IAM permissions that may touch resources created by CDK.
+  * CDK may create AWS [Lambda-based CloudFormation Custom Resources](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSCloudFormation/latest/UserGuide/template-custom-resources.html) to perform actions at deployment time. Any identity with `lambda:InvokeFunction` permissions can trigger such a function and effectively assume the function’s execution role permissions;
+
+  * CloudFormation Stack deployments can replace resource policies on resources owned by another Stack;
+
+  * AWS Step Functions-backed Custom Resources hold a signed S3 URL secret in their State Machine State. Anyone with `stepfunctions:DescribeExecution` permissions can read this secret.
+
+
+
+
+You should not use CDK in an environment where untrusted identities might perform AWS CloudFormation deployments, or where untrusted identities have AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) permissions that might interact with resources created by CDK.