AWS guardduty: GuardDuty IAM finding docs add Lambda credential detection
Summary
Extends the ResourceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS finding description to cover AWS Lambda function credentials (in addition to ECS task credentials) and makes minor grammar corrections.
Security assessment
The edit broadens the documented scope of a credential-exfiltration detection to include Lambda function credentials, which is security-relevant detection guidance but not a fix for a specific vulnerability.
Evidence
+### Credentials that were created exclusively for an AWS Amazon ECS task or AWS Lambda function are being used from another account within AWS
Diff
diff --git a/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-iam.md b/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-iam.md index 4e0a9a1ef..ef8c1d023 100644 --- a//guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-iam.md +++ b//guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-iam.md @@ -480 +480 @@ This finding's default severity is High. However, if the API was invoked by an a -This finding informs you when your Amazon EC2 instance credentials are used to invoke APIs from an IP address or an Amazon VPC endpoint, that is owned by a different AWS account than the one that the associated Amazon EC2 instance is running in. VPC endpoint detection is only available for services that support network activity events for VPC endpoints. For information about services that support network activity events for VPC endpoints, see [Logging network activity events](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/logging-network-events-with-cloudtrail.html) in the _AWS CloudTrail User Guide_. +This finding informs you when your Amazon EC2 instance credentials are used to invoke APIs from an IP address or a Amazon VPC endpoint, that is owned by a different AWS account than the one that the associated Amazon EC2 instance is running in. VPC endpoint detection is only available for services that support network activity events for VPC endpoints. For information about services that support network activity events for VPC endpoints, see [Logging network activity events](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/logging-network-events-with-cloudtrail.html) in the _AWS CloudTrail User Guide_. @@ -572 +572 @@ If this activity is unexpected, your credentials may be compromised. For more in -### Credentials that were created exclusively for an AWS Amazon ECS task are being used from another account within AWS +### Credentials that were created exclusively for an AWS Amazon ECS task or AWS Lambda function are being used from another account within AWS @@ -585 +585 @@ This finding's default severity is High. However, if the API was invoked by an a -This finding informs you when your AWS Amazon ECS task credentials are used to invoke APIs from an IP address or an Amazon VPC endpoint, that is owned by a different AWS account than the one that the associated resource is running in. VPC endpoint detection is only available for services that support network activity events for VPC endpoints. For information about services that support network activity events for VPC endpoints, see [Logging network activity events](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/logging-network-events-with-cloudtrail.html) in the _AWS CloudTrail User Guide_. +This finding informs you when your AWS Amazon ECS task credentials or AWS Lambda function credentials are used to invoke APIs from an IP address or a Amazon VPC endpoint, that is owned by a different AWS account than the one that the associated resource is running in. VPC endpoint detection is only available for services that support network activity events for VPC endpoints. For information about services that support network activity events for VPC endpoints, see [Logging network activity events](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/logging-network-events-with-cloudtrail.html) in the _AWS CloudTrail User Guide_. @@ -599 +599 @@ For Amazon ECS tasks, credentials are associated with the task role and detectio -This finding gets generated when AWS API requests are made inside AWS through an resource outside of your AWS account, by using your AWS Amazon ECS task role. It may be customary, such as for Transit Gateway architecture in a [hub and spoke](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/building-scalable-secure-multi-vpc-network-infrastructure/transit-vpc-solution.html) configuration, to route traffic through a single hub egress VPC with AWS service endpoints. If this is expected behavior, we recommend that you use [Suppression rules](./findings_suppression-rule.html) with filter criteria finding type, which should be UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ResourceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS. +This finding gets generated when AWS API requests are made inside AWS through an resource outside of your AWS account, by using your AWS Amazon ECS task credentials or AWS Lambda function credentials. It may be customary, such as for Transit Gateway architecture in a [hub and spoke](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/building-scalable-secure-multi-vpc-network-infrastructure/transit-vpc-solution.html) configuration, to route traffic through a single hub egress VPC with AWS service endpoints. If this is expected behavior, we recommend that you use [Suppression rules](./findings_suppression-rule.html) with filter criteria finding type, which should be UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ResourceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS.